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for Arbitrators After Aetna Casualty
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I. INTRODUCTION
Court sanctioned, nonbinding arbitration is one of the most widely
used methods of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) today. One form of
nonbinding arbitration allows each opposing party to appoint an arbitrator,
with a third arbitrator being selected by the party-appointees to serve as
chairperson. After parties present evidence in an arbitration hearing
conducted by the chairperson, the arbitrators reach a verdict and present
their ruling to the parties. If the parties agree to the panel's finding, a
final judgment will be entered by the sanctioning court in accordance with
the panel's recommendations. If the parties cannot reach an agreement,
either party typically has the right to challenge the findings of the panel in
a more traditional forum.
Generally, arbitrators are obligated to view the evidence
objectively in reaching their decisions. However, party-appointed
arbitrators are permitted to pursue their appointer's interests to a certain
degree. Such pursuit will normally be a result of the arbitrators'
specialized expertise in, or experience with, the specific claim of the party
who appointed them. An inherent conflict exists between allowing an
arbitrator to represent a party's interests, and requiring impartiality. Such
conflict leads to repeated challenges of arbitral awards.
The impetus to this Note is the April 1991 decision in Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. v. Grabbert,1 involving an issue of first impression
to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. Although only binding in Rhode
Island, the decision in Grabbert may serve to "underminel] public
confidence in and the integrity of the arbitration process" and "detract[]
from its legitimacy as an alternative method of private dispute resolution'2
nationwide.
II. THE CASE
Mr. Grabbert, the claimant, was involved in an automobile
accident and sought to recover under the uninsured motorist provision of
his Aetna insurance policy. When the parties failed to reach a mutually
satisfactory settlement, Grabbert requested and was granted a nonbinding
arbitration of his claim pursuant to an arbitration clause found within the
1. 590 A.2d 88 (R.I. 1991).
2. Id. at 92.
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policy.3 In accordance with the terms of the arbitration clause, each party
chose their own arbitrator, and the two party-appointed arbitrators chose a
third to serve as chairperson. The arbitration panel returned a unanimous
verdict for Grabbert and awarded him $43,550, plus costs incurred in
pursuing his claim, including his arbitrator's fee. Grabbert's counsel
forwarded a final bill to Aetna which included a sum designated as the
arbitrator's fee. The arbitrator's fee was for $4,355, exactly 10% of the
award. Later the arbitrator's fee was reduced to $435 under the guise of a
typographical error. Grabbert's arbitrator, however, admitted that it was
his customary practice to charge a fee based on a percentage of the award
received by the claimant.4 Grabbert and his arbitrator did not discuss a
fee agreement prior to the panel's decision.
3. The arbitration clause provided:
If we and a covered person do not agree:
1. Whether that person is legally entitled to recover damages
from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle;
or
2. on the amount of damages;
either party may make a written demand for arbitration. In this event,
each party will select an arbitrator. The two arbitrators will select a
third. If they cannot agree within 30 days, either may request that
selection be made by a judge of a court having jurisdiction. Each party
will:
1. Pay the expenses it incurs; and
2. Bear the expense of the third arbitrator equally.
Unless both parties agree otherwise, arbitration will take place in the
county and state in which the covered person lives. Local rules of law
as to procedure and evidence will apply. A decision agreed to by two
of the arbitrators will be binding. However, either party may make a
written demand for a trial if the amount of damages awarded is greater
than the minimum limit for bodily injury liability specified by the
financial responsibility law of the state in which your covered auto is
principally garaged. If this demand is not made within 60 days of the
arbitrators' decision, the amount of damages awarded by the arbitrators
will be binding.
Id. at 89.
4. Id. at 90.
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A. Lower Court
Aetna refused to pay and filed a complaint in the superior court
demanding a trial by jury on the issue of damages. Aetna alleged that the
arbitrators' award was nonbinding as the amount exceeded Rhode Island's
1985 financial responsibility limit of $25,000, giving Aetna the right to
challenge the award before a court of law. Furthermore, Aetna challenged
the award of Grabbert's arbitrator's fee, relying on the language of the
policy requiring each party to pay its own costs.' Additionally, Aetna
claimed that Grabbert's party-appointed arbitrator's contingent fee created
evident partiality in the arbitrator which was in conflict with a Rhode
Island statute,' requiring the court to vacate the award.7
Following Pepin v. American Universal Ins. Co. a decision
rendered by the Rhode Island Supreme Court after Aetna filed its
complaint, the superior court upheld Aetna's liability for the arbitrator's
fee pursuant to the contract provisions. However, the trial court agreed
with Aetna that the party-appointed arbitrator's contingent fee was
improper and vacated the award on the grounds that such a fee
arrangement, contingent on the ultimate award, created an evident
partiality inappropriate to one who sits in judgment.9 Accordingly, the
5. Id.
6. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-3-12(2) (1985) provides:
In any of the following cases, said court must make an order vacating
the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration:
(2) Where there was evident partiality or. corruption on the
part of the arbitrators, or either of them.
7. Grabbert, 590 A.2d at 91.
8. 540 A.2d 21 (R.I. 1988).
9. It seems to the Court that one who acts as a judge whose:
remuneration is related to the amount of any judgment violates the
tenets of any judicial function, and [sic] arbitration fee should be
reimbursement for time spent performing the function of being a judge
with your other two arbitrators, and that the award should consider only
the evidence presented to the panel of arbitrators and a good faith effort
to arrive at a fair judgment, that when one fee as an arbitrator is keyed
to whether or not the person who suggested his name as the arbitrator
recovers, and if recovery is made, that the fee arrangement related to a
percentage of the award, it destroys in my judgment the validity of that
award and strikes at the very heart of a fair and impartial panel
considering damages.
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superior court vacated the entire arbitration award. The partiality of an
arbitrator is grounds for setting aside the award, "but to induce a court to
grant leave to revoke the entry of the award, very strong grounds must be
shown.". 0
B. Supreme Court
Grabbert appealed the superior court decision to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court. The supreme court agreed with the lower court decision,
finding that "the party-appointed arbitrator's contingent fee gave him a
direct financial interest in the award that was absolutely improper. ""
Despite this finding, the court reversed the lower court's decision because
Aetna "failed to demonstrate the required causal nexus between the party-
appointed arbitrator's improper conduct and the award that was ultimately
decided upon."'2 While broadly denouncing contingency fee
arrangements for party-appointed arbitrators, the court let the award stand
because of Aetna's failure to demonstrate the causal nexus required for
vacating such award.' In so doing, the court demonstrated the inherent
conflict between party-appointed arbitrators and the requirement for
impartiality. The court provided no guidance for developing standards to
determine the existence of the forbidden partiality. Instead, it offered only
slight justification as to why vacation of this particular award was
improper and left the development of a predictable, guiding test to another
forum.
I do not countenance that fee arrangement. I think it's
destructive of the system, and it undermines peoples' confidence in the
system.
Grabbert, 590 A.2d at 91.
10. SIDNEY BILLING, THE LAW OF AWARDS AND ARBITRATIONS 101 (London, William
Benning & Co. 1845).
11. Grabbert, 590 A.2d at 92.
12. Id. at 92.
13. Id. at 97.
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IIl. EVIDENT PARTIALITY AS GROUNDS FOR VACATING AWARD
The Federal Arbitration Act14 (Act) provides the "evident
partiality" requirement for vacating an arbitration award. The Act grants
discretionary power to vacate an award when evident partiality of an
arbitrator exists.' While providing the overall test, the Act neither gives
useful guidance to its application nor defines the elements necessary to
show evident partiality.
Case law varies regarding the necessary elements. The Grabben
court stated, "evident partiality is an elusive concept for which no one has
been able to articulate a precise legal standard."16  Most courts
addressing the issue, however, have found that evident partiality requires a
showing of more than an appearance of bias, but less than actual bias. 7
Despite the adoption by most states of statutes similar to the Federal
Arbitration Act,' 5 the path to resolving the elements of evident partiality
remains unclear.
14. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1988 & Supp. II 1991).
15. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1988 & Supp. 1I 1991) provides:
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the
district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the
award upon the application of any party to the arbitration-
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them.
16. Grabbert, 590 A.2d at 95-96 (approving International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local
Union No. 323 v. Coral Elec. Corp., 104 F.R.D. 88, 89 (S.D. Fla. 1985)).
17. Grabbert, 590 A.2d at 96.
18. Similar statutes include: ALA. CODE § 6-6-14 (1975); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-108-
212 (Michie 1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-13 (1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 658-9 (1985);
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-1-16 (West 1983); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417.160 (Michie Bobbs-
Merrill 1991); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 150C § 11 (Law. Co-op. 1989); Miss. CODE ANN. §
11-15-21 (1972); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-312 (1991); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38.145
(Michie 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-7-12 (Michie 1978); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. LAW
§ 7511 (McKinney 1980); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-29.2-12 (1991); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §
2711.10 (Anderson 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-3-12 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-114
(1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31a-14 (1987); W. VA. CODE § 55-10-4 (1981).
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IV. THE STANDARD
A. Code of Judicial Conduct
The Grabbert court does not go so far as to hold arbitrators to the
same standard of conduct as judges. The Code of Judicial Conduct"
requires judges to disqualify themselves from any proceeding if there
exists even the slightest financial interest in the controversy or in a party
to the proceeding that might be affected by the outcome of the
proceeding." The Grabbert court agreed with the Second Circuit in
International Produce, Inc. v. A/S Rosshavet,2" recognizing that applying
such a standard to party-appointed arbitrators would ignore the practical
19. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988) provides:
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceeding;
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his
spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a
financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a
party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(d) For purposes of this section the following words or phrases shall
have the meaning indicated:
(4) "financial interest" means ownership of a legal or
equitable interest however small, or a relationship as
director, advisor, or other active participation in the affairs
of a party ....
21. 638 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981).
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realities of such arbitration panels.' The Rosshavet court recognized that
"the most sought-after arbitrators are those who are prominent and
experienced members of the specific business community in which the
dispute to be arbitrated arose. Since they are chosen precisely because of
their involvement in that community, some degree of overlapping
representation and interest inevitably results. "23
Following the reasoning of the Rosshavet court regarding
arbitrators, the Grabbert court further found that "[i]t is often because they
are men of affairs, not apart from but of the marketplace, that they are
effective in their adjudicatory function."2 Believing that a relationship to
the industry is desirable, if not also to the business of the party appointing
the arbitrator itself, the court sanctioned some predisposition on the part of
the arbitrator. Thus, it appears that the standards and sanctions of the
Code of Judicial Conduct are too strict to apply to the role of a party-
appointed arbitrator. A predisposition towards the appointer is consistent
with the understanding of the parties. "The reason the parties contract for
the choice of their own arbitrator is to ensure that each party will have his
or her 'side' represented on the arbitration panel by a sympathetic
member. "'
Furthermore, a party-appointed arbitrator's expertise makes an
ADR system desirable to litigants. To impede parties' selection of eligible
arbitrators would only force disputants back into the court system and
undermine the advantages of this ADR framework. Although there is an
inherent conflict between impartiality and expertise, it is one that the
courts have countenanced to further the goals of ADR.
B. Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes
The Grabbert court relied primarily on the Code of Ethics for
Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes (Code) in deriving its ruling. 7
The Code is a compilation of ethical guidelines and considerations
prepared by a joint committee consisting of special committees of the
American Arbitration Association and the American Bar Association.
22. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Grabbert, 590 A.2d 88, 92 (R.I. 1991).
23. See supra note 21, at 552.
24. Grabbert, 590 A.2d at 92 (citing Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental
Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968) (White, J., concurring)).
25. Grabbert, 590 A.2d at 93 (citing Astoria Medical Group v. Health Ins. Plan of
Greater New York, 182 N.E.2d 85, 90 (1962)).
26. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN
COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (1977).
27. Grabbert, 590 A.2d at 93.
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Although the Code is meant to apply to all types 'of arbitrators, it
recognizes "that there is a long-established practice in some types of
arbitration for those arbitrators who are appointed by one party, acting
alone, to be governed by special ethical considerations.'"2 Therefore, the
Code, which sets forth its basic tenets in the first six canons, devotes
Canon VII to party-appointed arbitration situations.
Canon I commands an arbitrator to uphold the integrity and
fairness of the arbitration process. "[A]n arbitrator has a responsibility not
only to the parties but also to the process of arbitration itself, and must
observe high standards of conduct so that the integrity and fairness of the
process will be preserved."" Canon II requires an arbitrator to disclose
any interest or relationship likely to affect impartiality or which might
create an appearance of partiality or bias. Persons who are requested to
serve as arbitrators should, before accepting, disclose any direct or
indirect financial or personal interest in the outcome of the arbitration and
any existing or past financial relationships which are likely to affect
impartiality or which might reasonably create an appearance of partiality
or bias. This canon approves the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co.,"0
which applied Canon II and held that arbitrators should err on the side of
disclosure."1
Canon VI of the Code provides that arbitrators should be faithful
to the relationship of trust and confidentiality inherent in that office. More
specifically, Canon VI provides that such persons should scrupulously
avoid bargaining with parties over the amount of payments or engaging in
any communications concerning payments which would create an
appearance of coercion or other impropriety. Furthermore, the Code
provides that it is preferable that before the arbitrator finally accepts
appointment, the basis of payment be established and that all parties be
informed thereof in writing.'2
Although the above-cited Code provisions are broad-reaching and
expressly apply to all types of arbitration, the Code departs from these
sections by propounding specific considerations for party-appointed
arbitrations in Canon VII. The Code recognizes that there are many types
of tripartite arbitration in which the two arbitrators appointed by the
parties are not considered to be neutral and are expected to observe many,
28. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 26, at 4.
29. Id. at 5.
30. 393 U.S. 145 (1968).
31. Id. at 151-52.
32. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 26, at 11-12.
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but not all, of the same ethical standards as the neutral arbitrator. Canon
VII describes the ethical obligations which non-neutral party-appointed
arbitrators should observe and those which are inapplicable to them.'
Canon VII provides in applicable part:
A. Obligations Under Canon I:
Non-neutral party-appointed arbitrators should
observe all of the obligations of Canon I to uphold the integrity
and fairness of the arbitration process, subject only to the
following provisions:
(1) Non-neutral arbitrators may be predisposed toward
the party who appointed them but in all other respects
are obligated to act in good faith and with integrity
and fairness. For example, non-neutral arbitrators
should not engage in delaying tactics or harassment of
any party or witness and should not knowingly make
untrue or misleading statements to the other
arbitrators.
(2) The provisions of Canon I-D relating to
relationships and interests are not applicable to non-
neutral arbitrators.
B. Obligations Under Canon II:
Non-neutral party-appointed arbitrators should
disclose to all parties, and to the other arbitrators, all interests
and relationships which Canon II requires be disclosed.
Disclosure as required by Canon II is for the benefit not only
of the party who appointed the non-neutral arbitrator, but also
for the benefit of the other parties and arbitrators so that they
may know of any bias which may exist or appear to exist.
However, this obligation is subject to the following provisions:
(1) Disclosure by non-neutral arbitrators should be
sufficient to describe the general nature and scope of
any interest or relationship, but need not include as
33. Id. at 13.
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detailed information as is expected from persons
appointed as neutral arbitrators.
F. Obligations Under Canon VI:
Non-neutral party-appointed arbitrators should
observe all of the obligations of Canon VI to be faithful to the
relationship of trust inherent in the office of arbitrator, subject
only to the following provision:
(1) Non-neutral arbitrators are not subject to the
provisions of Canon VI-D with respect to any
payments by the party who appointed them.'
Canon VII, therefore, eliminates some of the broad-reaching ethical
requirements of the Code when applying it to non-neutral arbitrators. In
light of Canon VII, the Grabbert court found the contingency fee
arrangement at issue violative of the Code's provisions.
V. ETHICAL VIOLATIONS
The Grabbert court found that the contingency fee arrangement
with Grabbert's appointed arbitrator violated Canons I and II of the
Code.3' The court accepted the fact that a party-appointed arbitrator may
be predisposed toward the arbitrator's appointer; however, the court
stressed that this allowance does not relieve such an arbitrator from an
obligation to act in good faith and with integrity and fairness.36
The court asserted that the contingency fee arrangement gave the
arbitrator such a direct financial interest in the outcome of the hearing as
would tend to destroy pubic confidence in the integrity of the arbitration
process. While recognizing that a party-appointed arbitrator "is not bound
by the specific proscriptions of Canon VI-D relating to payments made to
the party-appointed arbitrator by the arbitrator's appointor,"37 the court
stated,
34. Id. at 12-15.
35. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Grabbert, 590 A.2d 88, 94 (R.I. 1991).
36. Id.
37. Id.
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[We do not read this exemption to eliminate a party-appointed
arbitrator's general ethical obligation under Canon I to uphold
the integrity and fairness of the arbitration process. We think
that the party-appointed arbitrator's contingent fee so clouds or
overshadows the advocacy expected of the arbitrator by vesting
him with a direct financial interest in the award that such a fee
arrangement cannot be permitted. On this point we are in
complete agreement with the trial justice.'
Consequently, the court believed that such a violation df Canon I served to
destroy public confidence in the integrity of the arbitration process,39 a
result explicitly avoided by the Code.
The court also found a violation of Canon II in Grabbert's
arbitrator's failure to disclose to Grabbert, Aetna, or the other two
arbitrators his normal practice of charging a ten percent contingent fee for
his services as an arbitrator.' Any direct or indirect financial interest in
the outcome or award of an arbitrator must be disclosed to the parties and
the other arbitrators under Canon II. Although this requirement is relaxed
under Canon VII-B(1), the court found that "even as mitigated by Canon
VII-B(1), [Canon II] required disclosure by the party-appointed arbitrator
beyond that found in the contractual provision of the insurance policy that
specified that each party was to pay for its own arbitrator."4 Although
this finding appears consistent with the court's general tenor in
condemning the arbitrator's contingency fee, it appears to ignore the
express language of Canon VII-B(1). Canon VII-B(1) requires only that
non-neutral arbitrators disclose information "sufficient to describe the
general nature and scope of any interest or relationship." 2 The section
does not require the arbitrator to "include as detailed information as is
expected from persons appointed as neutral arbitrators."' In deciding
that an ethical violation was committed in failing to disclose the particulars
of Grabbert's arbitrator's fee arrangement, the court failed to give any
mitigating effect to Canon VII-B(1) and held Grabbert's arbitrator to a
standard similar to Canon II.
Grabbert cited case law supporting the position that a party-
38. Id. at 94-95.
39. Id. at 94.
40. Id. at 95.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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appointed arbitrator's method of compensation is not grounds for vacating
an otherwise valid award. However, the court distinguished these cases,
citing with approval, a distinction developed by an Illinois appellate
court.' This distinction rests on whether the arbitrator's interest is direct
or indirect.
In the Illinois case, a party-appointed arbitrator for a labor union,
of which he was a member, was held to only have an indirect interest
arising out of the arbitration in which the union was a party.' The
Grabbert court found, however, that Grabbert's appointed arbitrator
benefitted solely on the basis of his role as a party-appointed arbitrator. If
removed from the arbitration, Grabbert's arbitrator would have no interest
in the outcome.' Therefore, Grabbert's arbitrator had a direct financial
interest in the outcome of the arbitration.
Despite this finding, the court refused to affirm the lower court
decision and instead reversed, reinstating the award. The court reversed
on the grounds that Aetna had failed to establish the required causal nexus
between the party-appointed arbitrator's contingency fee" arrangement and
the ultimate outcome of the arbitration hearing.
The Grabbert court's decision is a dichotomy. On one hand, the
court adopted the "reasonable person" standard in determining evident
partiality to one party to an arbitration,47 developed in Morelite
Construction Corp. v. New York City District Council Carpenters Benefit
Funds.' In Morelite, the Second Circuit found evident partiality in an
arbitrator who was the son of a vice-president of the international union
whose local district union was a party to the arbitration. Knowing nothing
of the relationship between the arbitrator son and the father, other than the
familial relationship, the court still found evident partiality because
"reasonable people would have to believe [the relationship] provides strong
evidence of partiality by the arbitrator.""' Applying this test to the
present case, the Grabbert court found that a reasonable person would
similarly conclude that the amount of the arbitrator's fee being contingent
on the amount of the arbitration panel's award provided strong evidence of
partiality by the arbitrator.50 Consequently, the court found that a direct
financial interest, ethical violations, and a reasonable belief of partiality
44. West Towns Bus Co. v. Division 241, 168 N.E.2d 473 (I11. App. Ct. 1960).
45. Id.
46. Grabben, 590 A.2d at 95.
47. Id. at 96.
48. 748 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1984).
49. Morelite, 748 F.2d at 84-85.
50. Grabbert, 590 A.2d at 96.
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existed.
On the other hand, the court failed to affirm the lower court's
decision to vacate the award because of Aetna's failure to establish a
causal relationship between the contingency fee agreement and the ultimate
award. Furthermore, the court held that the present case could be
distinguished from Morelite. The court made the distinction because the
arbitration panel reached a unanimous decision, thus supporting the
position of Grabbert's arbitrator regardless of his bias, and because
Aetna's challenge did not come until after the court's decision in Pepin v.
American Universal Insurance Co.,' which challenged an arbitration
award due to partiality. Because Aetna amended its complaint to include
allegations of partiality after Pepin was decided, the court felt that the
arbitrator's improper conduct had little direct effect on the award.'
VI. CRrrIQUE
The outcome of the case was not logical based on the decisions of the
court. It is unfathomable how the Grabbert court could make the findings
it did, yet reverse the lower court's order vacating the arbitration award.
The court clearly found a direct financial interest by the party-appointed
arbitrator in the outcome of the arbitration. Although it never expressly
uses "evident partiality," the court applied the Morelite test to this
financial interest and found such partiality on behalf of the arbitrator.
According to the Federal Arbitration Act, the Rhode Island statute, and the
Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, such a finding of
partiality clearly mandates overturning the award upon proper motion by
Aetna.
The Grabbert court, however, refused to overturn the award not
only because of Aetna's late filing, but also because the award was
unanimous. While the court's ruling was meant to support the policy
concerns of preserving the finality of arbitration awards and thereby
further bolstering public confidence in such awards, the court's
justification is misapplied. When ethical violations are found, whether a
causal relationship exists between the violation and the outcome should be
irrelevant. The ethical violations presented here should per se allow a trial
on the issue of damages. The court has no way of determining what
influence the non-neutral party-appointed arbitrator had on the
proceedings. Perhaps Grabbert's arbitrator was so overbearing and
51. 540 A.2d 21 (R.I. 1988).
52. Grabbert, 590 A.2d at 96-97.
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convincing as to undermine the panel's ability to view the facts
objectively. His violation of the arbitrators' ethical code so tainted the
proceedings as to warrant rehearing of the issues.
Furthermore, the court's failure to attack the award on the
grounds of Canon V of the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial
Disputes is an interesting oversight. Canon V provides that "[a]n
arbitrator should decide all matters justly, exercising independent
judgment, and should not permit outside pressure to affect the
decision."' Certainly the fee arrangement here could be considered an
outside interest which might affect the arbitrator's decision. The court
may not have felt this provision applied because it is mitigated by Canon
VII-E, which permits a non-neutral arbitrator "to be predisposed toward
deciding in favor of the party who appointed [him or her]."' Canon V
was never expressly addressed by the court.
The court's ruling in Grabbert may actually serve to erode public
confidence in arbitration. While the integrity of the arbitration process is
supported by a general policy of finality of judgments, it is certainly
destroyed by a belief that an award, tainted with ethical violations by an
arbitrator, cannot be successfully challenged.
The Grabbert court broadly rejected all contingency fee
arrangements for party-appointed arbitrators,' yet it allowed this award
to stand. The court claimed that regardless of the policy concern for
finality of judgments, improper awards should be overturned 6 -- but then
failed to do so.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
Promulgating standards to apply in situations where partiality on
the part of a party-appointed arbitrator may exist would be helpful. A per
se rule could be employed which would require the overturning of an
arbitration award any time there is a showing of bias on the side of the
prevailing party. If bias is suspected after an arbitration panel renders an
53. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 26, at 11.
54. Id. at 15.
55. "In our opinion, the only acceptable method of calculating an arbitrator's fee is on
the basis of time worked." Grabbert, 590 A.2d at 96.
56. "As a general rule we feel that no matter how desirable the finality of an arbitration
may be, it is more important that an award be rendered free from any improprieties that
affect the award and that could destroy public confidence in and the integrity of the
arbitration process." Id. at 92 (citing Barcon Associates, Inc. v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp.,
430 A.2d 214, 219 (1981) (citing Moshier v. Shear, 102 111. 169, 174 (1881)).
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award, the sanctioning court could hold a hearing on the issue of bias.
Should bias be found, the court would refer the matter back to arbitration,
requiring a new arbitrator in place of the biased arbitrator. If no bias is
found, the matter would proceed as normal, with the parties deciding
whether to accept the arbitration award. Furthermore, if bias is suspected
prior to the arbitration, either party could make a motion to the
sanctioning court to remove the arbitrator. A judge could make a
determination whether the arbitrator is biased on the basis of the facts
presented in the motion and rule appropriately. Such a rule could be
easily applied and would lend predictability and precedent to questions
regarding suspicions of bias. It would urge arbitrators to disclose any
semblance of bias which might exist before the arbitration, allowing a
substitute arbitrator to be selected should any conflict appear. Substituting
arbitrators prior to the arbitration would prevent rehearing on the issue of
bias before a court, as well as a rehearing on the merits, which would aid
in the promotion of finality of arbitration decisions. Moreover, such a per
se test, rigidly applied, would bolster integrity in the arbitration process.
This system would allow participation of arbitrators who could be both
impartial and able to represent parties' interests because of the arbitrators'
expertise in the subject matter of the dispute.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Federal Arbitration Act and the parallel state statutes offer
insufficient guidance in the application of the evident partiality standard.
The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes and certain
case law help to clarify the appropriate standards. Cases such as
Grabbert, however, do nothing but muddy the waters and lead to even
greater litigation to clarify the issues of arbitrator impropriety and the
finality of arbitration awards. Given an opportunity to develop standards
which would aid in the promotion of ADR integrity, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court failed to provide an easily applied and predictable test,
leaving that task to courts faced with similar issues.
Keith H. Raker

